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REFORMS IN MEDICAL DEVICE 
REGULATION: AN EXAMINATION 
OF THE SILICONE GEL BREAST 
IMPLANT DEBACLE 
Rebecca Weisman * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 6, 1992, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) called for a forty-fIve-day moratorium l on silicone gel 
breast implants.2 While the moratorium exacerbated the current 
debate over the implant's safety,3 health questions remain unan-
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. Thanks to my editors, 
Monica McCrary, Rosanne Calbo-Jackson, Jessica Rudin, and Brian Paget, for their in-
valuable comments on earlier drafts. I also wish to thank LeRoy Hersh for making avail-
able non-confidential information relating to silicone gel breast implants. 
1. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES, Pub. No. P92-I (1992) (H.H.S. News). 
2. Silicone gel breast implants are elasticized silicone pouches filled with silicone gel. 
21 C.F.R. § 878 (1990). Medically known as mammoplasty, over two million women have 
had the surgery. J. Douglas Peters & Margaret M. Aulino, Breast Implants: Science and 
Litigation, TRIAL, Nov. 1991, at 26. According to FDA estimates, twenty percent of 
breast implants follow a mastectomy and eighty percent are performed exclusively for 
cosmetic reasons. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, Pub. No. T91-18 (1991) (Talk Paper). Recently, juries have awarded 
large sums to plaintiffs. Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., No. C-91-2132, 1991 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8580 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 1992) (verdict for plaintiff for $7.3 million). In Decem-
ber 1992, a jury awarded a Houston woman $25 million in damages which included $20 
million as punitive damages against silicone gel breast implant manufacturer Bristol-
Myers Squibb. Gautam Naik, Woman Receives $25 Million Judgment in Bristol-Myers 
Breast Implant Suit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1992, at AI, A3. 
3. A variety of medical problems have been associated with silicone gel breast im-
plants. Complications include fibrous capsular contracture (painful hardening of the 
breast), silicone gel leakage (all silicone gel-filled implants are thought to leak small 
amounts of silicone) and migration, silicone gel rupture, infection, interference with early 
tumor detection, degradation of polyurethane foam covered breast prosthesis, human 
carcinogenicity (cancer), human teratogenicity (disturbed growth processes involved in 
the production of a malformed fetus), autoimmune disease, and calcification. Breast im-
plants have been linked to scleroderma, rheumatoid arthritis, and lupus (which can be 
973 
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swered." On February 20, 1992, after three days of hearings on 
the safety of silicone gel breast implants, an advisory panel rec-
ommended to the FDA that silicone gel breast implants remain 
on the market, but with substantial new restrictions. II On April 
16, 1992, the FDA adopted the panel's recommendations, per-
mitting the availability of silicone gel breast implants only under 
controlled clinical studies.s Women desiring silicone implants for 
reconstruction after cancer surgery or because of severe deform-
ity will have access to the devices, while the FDA will limit the 
number of women receiving implants for cosmetic reasons to the 
amount required to answer safety questions. 7 
This article will consider the regulatory policies of the FDA 
in protecting the health of the nation's women, particularly its 
handling of silicone gel breast implants and its policing of the 
leading implant manufacturer, Dow Corning Corporation.8 While 
this article recognizes the various difficult problems which the 
FDA must address in protecting consumers from unsafe food, 
drugs, and medical devices, it also recognizes the need for re-
form. This article will describe what resulted from the tragedies 
fatal). 55 Fed. Reg. 20,570-71 (1990) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 878). The implants 
may cause changes in nipple sensation. Children who nursed from mothers with silicone 
gel implants have experienced problems allegedly attributed to the implants. FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UPDATE ON 
SILICONE GEL-FILLED BREAST IMPLANTS (1992). 
4. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES, Pub. No. P92-35 (1992) (Talk Paper). 
5. The advisory panel recommended, after hearing evidence from plastic surgeons, 
cancer specialists, rheumatologists, implant makers, nurses, breast cancer survivors, im-
plant users, and others, that 
1. Implants should remain available to women who have had 
breast cancer surgery or severe deformity. 
2. Use should be restricted in yet unspecified ways to women 
seeking, breast augmentation for cosmetic purposes. 
3. All women who receive implants will be registered and 
monitored in studies in order to collect long-term data on the 
devices. 
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, Vol. X, No.2 (1992). 
6. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES, Pub. No. P92-11 (1992) (H.H.S. News). Under the new guidelines, before a woman 
may receive silicone gel breast implants, a physician must certify that saline-filled im-
plants are an inappropriate alternative. Id. 
7. Id. The FDA is also requiring silicone gel breast implant manufacturers to con-
duct laboratory studies under an FDA-imposed timetable. Id. 
8. Dow Corning Corporation is a 50-50 joint venture between Corning, Inc. and Dow 
Chemical Co. Naik, supra note 2, at A3. 
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of diethylstilbestrol (DES) and the Dalkon Shield. With these 
failures in mind, this article will examine present FDA policies, 
describe social forces outside of the agency which affect women's 
health as well as regulatory decisions, and propose reforms that 
will enhance the effectiveness of protections for the women of 
this country. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FDA AND ITS ROLE IN REGULAT-
ING SAFETY 
In 1938, Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act9 
as a result of growing concern about the safety of food and 
drugs. 1o This legislation authorized the FDA to regulate food, 
drugs, and therapeutic devices sold or transported in interstate 
commerce. ll The underlying policy was to ensure the safety of 
food and drugs12 and to promote honesty and fair dealing for the 
benefit of consumers.13 
Congress has continued to make amendments to the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to allow the FDA to more effec-
tively protect consumers and to keep current with technological, 
economic, and social realities.H To address the problem of the 
9. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1987). 
10. Wallace F. Janssen, The U.S. Food and Drug Law: How it Came, How it Works, 
FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE, Pub. No. 92-1054, May 1992, at 1, 4. The death of over 100 
people from a poisonous drug, elixir sulfanilamide, prompted this legislation. The drug 
manufacturer was guilty only of mislabeling its product. PETER ASCH, CONSUMER SAFETY 
REGULATION: PUTTING A PRICE ON LIFE AND LIMB, 18-19 (1988). 
11. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1987). 
12. The term "drugs" includes: any article recognized in the official U.S. Pharmaco-
poeia, Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary; any article intended for use 
in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease; articles other than 
food intended to affect the structure or function of the body; or articles intended for use 
as a component in any of the foregoing. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1987). 
13. Janssen, supra note 10, at 4. 
14. [d. The Pesticide Amendment in 1954, the Food Additives Amendment in 1958, 
and the Color Additive Amendment in 1960 provide that manufacturers cannot legally 
put substances falling into these categories into the stream of commerce absent a prior 
determination of their safety. 21 U.S.C. §§ 342, 321, 409 (1992). In an attempt to tighten 
control over prescription, new, and investigational drugs, Congress passed the Drug 
Amendments of 1962, which require drug manufacturers to demonstrate a drug's safety 
and effectiveness prior to immersion into the marketplace. Drug manufacturers are re-
quired to provide the FDA with any instances of adverse reactions to their products and 
to inform doctors of the risks as well as the benefits. Since the passage of these amend-
3
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FDA's limited resources, the FDA required manufacturers to 
perform adequate research to prove the safety of any substance 
they wished to market. III For the first time, the FDA policy was 
one of prevention through regulation, rather than prosecuting 
violations after the damage had occurred. I6 
In 1976, Congress passed the 1976 Medical Device Amend-
ment,17 amending the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to 
authorize the FDA to regulate medical devices. IS The amend-
ment gave the FDA the authority and the responsibility to as-
sure consumers that medical devices are safe and effective. Io The 
FDA is required to classify20 all devices for human use marketed 
in the United States into one of three regulatory classes2I so that 
the FDA can appropriately control each device.22 
In 1990, Congress passed the Safe Medical Devices Act of 
1990,23 requiring medical device user facilities24 and manufactur-
ments, the FDA has removed from the market thousands of drugs for lack of safety or 
effectiveness. Many other drugs have required a labeling change to accurately reflect 
medical facts. Janssen, supra note 10, at 7; L & M Indus. v. Kenter, 321 F. Supp. 1131 
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (FDA detained plaintiff's goods because of labeling misrepresentation); 
Dietary Supplemental Coalition, Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1992) (FDA initi-
ated seizure proceedings of plaintiff's food products because of unsafe food additives); 
Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott, & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973) (FDA withdrew 
approval from the drug Lutrexin because of an insufficient showing of its effectiveness 
for its intended purpose). 
15. Janssen, supra note 10, at 4. 
16. [d. 
17. 21 U.S.C. § 334(b)(1)(A) (1992). 
18. A "device" is any instrument, apparatus or contrivance, including their compo-
nents, parts and accessories, intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment or prevention of disease. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1992). 
19. Janssen, supra note 10, at 4. 
20. 55 Fed. Reg. 20,568 (1990) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 878). 
21. The three classes are general controls, performance standards, and premarket 
approval, classes I to III respectively. Only a medical device classified as a class III de-
vice requires approval before entering the stream of commerce. However, class III 
preamendment devices, those devices which were on the market prior to the 1976 Medi-
cal Device Amendment, may be marketed without premarket approval until ninety days 
after the FDA's promulgation of a final rule requiring premarket approval for the device 
or thirty months after final classification of the device, whichever is later. Thus, after a . 
preamendment device is classified as a class III device, the manufacturer has thirty 
months to submit appropriate safety data, during which the class III device may be com-
mercially distributed. 21 U.S.C. § 360(c) (1992). 
22. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES, REQUIREMENTS OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS ENFORCED BY THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, 5 (1985). 
23. 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 301(d), 360(i) (1992). 
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ers to report to the FDA deaths, serious illnesses, and serious 
injuries related to medical devices.21i Pursuant to this amend-
ment, the FDA may order manufacturers to stop distributing 
and physicians to stop using a medical device. 26 The FDA may 
also order a recall.27 Further, medical device manufacturers must 
monitor new patients and warn them directly if serious problems 
arise.2S However, because the new law is not retroactive, manu-
facturers do not need to notify patients who had medical devices 
prior to the law's enactment if serious problems develop.29 
The purpose of the FDA and the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938 and its subsequent Amendments is to pro-
tect and preserve the public health.30 The FDA decides what is 
safe and resolves difficult technological questions that have ma-
jor impacts on the health and welfare of the nation. The FDA's 
goal is to ensure that consumers are able to make an informed 
decision, based on appropriate research and scientific studies. 
B. FDA ACTIONS AND ITs MONITORING OF SILICONE GEL BREAST 
IMPLANTS 
Although manufacturers have marketed silicone implants 
since the 1960's, the FDA did not have authority to regulate the 
implants until the passage of the 1976 Medical Device Amend-
ment.31 Manufacturers of devices on the market prior to 1976 
were not required to provide the FDA with scientific evidence of 
safety to continue marketing the implants.32 Although the FDA 
had authority to request safety data from silicone gel implant 
manufacturers in 1976,33 the agency took no action regarding the 
implants until litigation disclosed potential dangers. 
24. "User facilities" include hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory facilities, doctor's 
offices, etc. Janssen, supra note 10, at 8. 
25. 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 301(d), 360(i) (1992). 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. 
30. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1992); Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. 
Conn. 1989). 
31. 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1992). 
32. See supra note 21. 
33. [d. 
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In 1981, a woman allegedly injured by implants initiated the 
first breast implant suit against a manufacturer.34 By 1982, the 
FDA had received sufficient information to determine that sili-
cone gel breast implants presented the potential for unreasona-
ble risks of injury.31i In 1988, internal documents from Dow 
Corning and the FDA,36 obtained by Public Citizen Health Re-
search Group,37 a consumer advocacy group, revealed that sili-
cone gel breast implants caused cancer in laboratory animals.38 
After analyzing the documents, Sidney M. Wolfe, director of 
Public Citizen Health Research Group, requested that then FDA 
Commissioner Frank Young ban silicone gel breast implants.39 
The FDA took no action. 
Various organizations have attempted to either inform 
women about the potential risks of silicone gel breast implants 
or inform the FDA of such hazards. Public Citizen Health Re-
search Group has implemented suits40 pursuant to the Freedom 
34. Klein v. Dow Corning Corp., 661 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff filed suit for 
$10 million in damages when her silicone gel breast implant ruptured). 
35. In 1982, the FDA published in the Federal Register that silicone gel breast im-
plants should be considered 'Category III medical devices, those devices which pose risks 
and are in need of further study. The FDA expressed concern about the hazards of leak-
age and the long term toxic effect of silicone gel breast implants. 47 Fed. Reg. 2,820 
(1991) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 878). The FDA, however, did not put silicone gel 
breast implants into the most restrictive category until 1988. 55 Fed. Reg. 20,568 (1990) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 878). Evidence suggests that Dow Corning knew as early as 
the 1970's that implants had adverse health risks. Stuart A. Schlesinger, Products Liabil-
ity: Concealment of Critical Information, N.Y. L. J., Mar. 18, 1992, at 3-5. Dow Corning 
has disclosed that in 1971 it had information revealing that silicone could leak and cause 
damage to surrounding tissue and other areas of the body. Dow Corning also knew that if 
the gel migrated to other areas of the body, serious medical problems could arise. Daniel 
Wise, Bar Besieged with Queries on Breast Implant Claims, N.Y. L. J., Jan. 30, 1992, at 
1, 1-2. 
36. Internal memorandum from Tom Talcott, Dow Corning Corp., Bleed of Mam-
mary Prosthesis (May 13, 1975); Internal documents from J. Cooper, Dow Corning 
Corp., Biosafety Testing Concerns (Jan. 8, 1985) (on file with the Golden Gate Univer-
sity Law Review). 
37. Teich v. FDA, 732 F. Supp. 17, 20 (D.D.C. 1990). 
38. Id.; see also Boyce Rensberger, Silicone Gel Found to Cause Cancer in Labora-
tory Rats; Citizens' Group Calls for Ban on Breast Implants, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 
1988, at A3. 
39. Rensberger, supra note 38, at A3. Wolfe revealed that the Dow Corning docu-
ments had been debated by the agency for months and that some FDA scientists thought 
that the evidence was alarming enough that the agency should issue a public warning 
and inform past and potential patients of any adverse risks posed by the implants. Id. 
40. Teich, 732 F. Supp. at 17 (responding to Public Citizen's request for safety data, 
both the FDA and Dow Corning claimed that the requested information was "confiden-
tial" commercial information and would cause Dow Corning substantial harm and impair 
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of Information Act (FOIA)4l to obtain safety information on the 
public's behalf. Because of the lack of information available to 
the public, Command Trust Network, Inc.42 attempted to inter-
vene in breast implant litigation for the purpose of vacating pro-
tective orders imposed by implant manufacturers.4a The organi-
zation's goal was to educate both the public and the FDA of 
potential health hazards of silicone gel breast implants." 
Despite years of complaints and suspicions that silicone gel 
breast implants posed significant health risks to wearers, the 
FDA did not place them in the most restrictive regulatory class 
until 1988,,11 The same year, the FDA heard allegations that im-
plant manufacturers had falsified data and delayed reporting ad-
verse effects of the implants .. e Consequently, the FDA advised 
the public to delay implantation procedures until the agency as-
sessed the risks of the implants,,7 On April 10, 1991, the FDA 
published a regulation requiring silicone breast implant manu-
facturers to submit data proving that the implants are safe and 
effective.48 
On November 15, 1991, an FDA advisory panel49 recom-
the FDA's ability to access safety data in the future). See also Teich v. FDA, 751 F. 
Supp. 243 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that the FDA must release all data submitted to it 'by 
Dow Corning and sharply criticizing the agency for failing to adequately exercise its 
authority). 
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1992). Exemption 4 provides that confidential commer-
cial information which is likely to cause substantial harm to a manufacturer's competi-
tive position will be shielded from public disclosure pursuant to a request under the 
FOIA. Other information may be disclosed. [d. 
42. Command Trust Network, Inc., a non-profit organization co-founded by Sybil N. 
Goldrich, who has suffered various medical complications from implants, is an organiza-
tion that attempts to educate women as well as the FDA about the potential health 
hazards associated with silicone breast implants. Mirak v. McGhan Medical Corp., 142 
F.R.D. 34, 35 (1992). 
43. [d. 
44. [d.; see also Sybil N. Goldrich, Remarks at the General & Plastic Surgery De-
vices Panel Meeting, North Auditorium, Wilbur J. Cohen Building, 330 Independence 
Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. (Nov. 22, 1988). 
45. 55 Fed. Reg. 20,568 (1990) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 878). 
46. Peters & Aulino, supra note 2, at 31. 
47. [d. 
48. FDA Talk Paper, supra note 2. 
49. Advisory panels, consisting of members from both the private and public sector, 
_ provide the government with expertise in a variety of areas. Michelle Nuszkiewicz, Note, 
Twenty Years of the Federal Advisory Committee Act: It's Time for Some Changes, 65 
S, CAL, L. REV. 957, 957 (1992). 
7
VVeisman: FDA Regulation and Reform
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
980 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:973 
mended to the FDA that the implants remain on the market. 50 
However, the same advisory panel voted against approving the 
devices, claiming that the manufacturers needed to perform fur-
ther studies to demonstrate the device's safety.51 On December 
13; 1991, Dr. Norman Anderson, a 1988 FDA advisory panel 
member, delivered previously unseen documents 52 along with a 
personal letter requesting that the FDA take silicone gel breast 
implants off the market. 53 On January 6, 1992, the FDA called 
for a temporary moratorium on the implants. 54 
On February 18, 1992, the FDA began hearings to assess the 
implant's safety.55 The advisory panel again concluded that 
there was insufficient information to determine the safety of the 
implants. 56 The panel recommended to the FDA that the im-
plants remain on the market, but with substantial new restric-
tions on their use. 57 The panel concluded that doctors should 
explicitly warn women seeking the device about the alleged de-
sign limitations of the device and should inform the women that 
at some point, they may have to have the implants removed. 58 
On April 16, 1992, the FDA announced that silicone gel 
breast implants would be available under controlled clinical 
studies. 59 Women desiring silicone implants for reconstruction 
after cancer surgery and for correction of severe deformities may 
50. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, u.s. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES, Pub. No. T91-72, PANEL ISSUES BREAST IMPLANT RECOMMENDATIONS (1991) (Talk 
Paper). 
51. Id. The previous day, the panel rejected safety data presented by Dow Corning, 
claiming that the data was insufficient to prove the product's safety. Id. 
52. Don J. DeBenedictis, FDA Action Spurs Implant Suits, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 
1, 20. The FDA had not previously seen these documents because of court protective 
orders. Id. 
53.Id. 
54. See supra note 1. 
55. See supra note 5. 
56. See supra note 1. 
57. See supra note 5. 
58. Malcolm Gladwell, Panel Urges Limited Use of Implants; FDA Asked to Curb 
Cosmetic Applications of Breast Devices, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1992, at AI. The FDA 
maintains that the devices should not be considered "lifetime" devices. UPDATE ON SILI-
CONE GEL-FILLED BREAST IMPLANTS, supra note 3. Under the learned intermediary doc-
trine, an adequate warning by manufacturers to physicians will eliminate the need for 
manufacturers to warn patients directly. The physician acts as a "learned intermediary" 
between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer. Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 
712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Conn. 1989). 
59. See supra note 5. 
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obtain them without limitations on availability. so The FDA will 
allow only a limited number of implants for cosmetic purposes,S1 
permitting access only to the number of women required to an-
swer safety questions.s2 
Many observers believe that litigation over the implants 
spurred the FDA to finally take some action.s3 When announcing 
the moratorium, FDA Commissioner David A. Kessler claimed 
that new information about implants amplified the agency's con-
cerns about their safety. 54 Specifically, Kessler claimed that 
much of the new information came from court files of two fed-
eral lawsuits, Hopkins v Dow Corning Corp.sI'> and Cardinal v. 
Dow Corning Corp. 88 
As of June, 1992, over 10,000 women have filed implant re-
lated suits.67 An FDA sp~keswoman revealed that over 8,000 re-
ports of problems alleged to be associated with the implants 
have been reported to the agency.S8 More complications and law 
suits are expected because the latency period for the develop-
ment of problems associated with the implants ranges from two 
to twenty-five years.S9 In addition, with the publicity of litiga-
tion, many women are for the first time making the connection 
that their medical problems may be linked to the implants.7o 
60.Id. 
61. H.H.S. News, supra note 6. 
62.Id. 
63. DeBenedictis, supra note 52, at 20. Some observers credit the moratorium to 
congressional pressure, FDA embarrassment at keeping a product on the market while 
questioning its safety, and fear of manufacturer liability. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., No. C-91-2132, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8580 
(N.D. Cal. May 27, 1992). 
66. Cardinal v. Dow Corning Corp., 1991 U.S. App. LEX IS 6517 (M.D. Ala. July 30, 
1991) (federal jury in Alabama awarded $5.4 million, later halved by a judge, in Toole v. 
McClintock, 778 F. Supp. 1543, 1545 (M.D. Ala. 1991)). The national litigator for Dow 
Corning claimed that the alleged new information was previously disclosed in a 1984 
case, Stern v. Dow Corning Corp., where a jury awarded the victim $1.7 million, as well 
as to an FDA advisory panel in 1988. DeBenedictis, supra note 52, at 20. 
67. Sandra G. Boodman, Breast Implants; Now Women are Having a Hard Time 
Getting Them Out, WASH POST, June 23, 1992, at Z10. 
68. Id.; see supra note 4. 
69. DeBenedictis, supra note 52, at 20. 
70.Id. 
9
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C. PREVIOUS FDA F AlLURES AND THE LITIGATION WHICH 
FOLLOWED 
Continued use of silicone gel breast implants for years after 
it was known that silicone was dangerous71 and that silicone 
leaked from the breast area into other parts of the body raises 
serious questions concerning physician liability, manufacturer li-
ability, and the effectiveness of the FDA concerning women's 
health and safety. The FDA has on other occasions failed to act 
responsibly when dealing with products affecting women's 
health and safety. The FDA's failure to assess the safety of sili-
cone gel breast implants is horrifyingly familiar to the diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES) litigation and the Dalkon Shield litigation.72 
1. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) 
DES is a synthetic estrogen ingested by women to prevent 
miscarriages,73 which doctors began prescribing in the late 
1940's.74 The FDA approved the drug for this purpose in 1947 
and was convinced of its safety by 1952.76 Hundreds of pharma-
ceutical manufacturers marketed the drug and millions of preg-
nant women ingested it during the 1950's and 1960's.76 In 1971, 
71. The FDA had informed the State Public Health Department that silicone was 
considered dangerous for use in human body tissue. In 1965, the FDA had obtained an 
injunction prohibiting transportation of silicone across state lines. Silicone was then clas-
sified as a "new drug" that could be used only under scientific circumstances after an 
application for the use had been approved. Nelson v. Gaunt, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167, 168 (Ct. 
App. 1981). 
72. Denise Dunleavy, a sole practitioner who represents over twenty clients claiming 
injuries from implants and who recently won a $4.45 million jury verdict in Livshits v. 
Natural Y Surgical Specialties, No. 87 Civ. 2403, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 11347 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989), fears that breast implant litigation will be a repeat of the "DES debacle" and 
believes the physical problems caused by implants are just beginning to emerge. Andrew 
Blum, Publicity Sparks Interest in Breast Implant Suits, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 29, 1991, at 
14. 
73. AscH, supra note 10, at 120. . 
74. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
75. Id. Discussions and word-of-mouth information which circulated among medical 
specialists and doctors contributed to widespread acceptance of DES as safe and effec-
tive in preventing miscarriages. Id. Although animal studies conducted in 1938 had re-
vealed that DES caused cancer, these studies were dismissed as irrelevant to humans. 
Peters & Aulino, supra note 2, at 26. 
76. Id. Although studies in the mid-1950's revealed that DES did not prevent mis-
carriage, it remained on the market. Terrie B. Brodie, Comment, Brown v. Superior 
Court: Drug Manufacturers Get Immunized from Strict Liability for Design Defects, 19 
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several physicians linked DES to a rare form of vaginal cancer77 
in young girls who had been exposed to the drug in the womb.78 
Shortly thereafter, the FDA halted the marketing of DES;79 
however, evidence reveals that doctors continued to prescribe it 
through the early 1970'S.80 
DES litigation has occupied courts throughout the country 
since the mid-1970's.81 In Bichler v. Eli Lilly,s2 the jury found 
that the manufacturers of DES wrongfully marketed the drug 
because they did not conduct any laboratory tests upon preg-
nant mice.83 Had the manufacturers performed such tests, phar-
maceutical companies would have discovered that DES was ca-
pable of causing grave and deadly damage to develop in the 
female offspring of women who ingested the drug.84 With this 
knowledge, manufacturers presumably would not have marketed' 
the drug for problems of pregnancy.81! 
The DES debacle has many parallels to the current situa-
tion with silicone gel breast implants. When DES manufacturers 
applied for FDA approval of the drug for ingestion by pregnant 
women, the manufacturers relied on tests by others which did 
not demonstrate either the drug's safety or effectiveness.86 When 
the FDA approved, on an experimental basis, the use of DES to 
prevent miscarriages,87 the manufacturers marketed and distrib-
uted it on an unlimited basis,88 in violation of FDA 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 435. 436 (1989); see also R. MEYERS. DES: THE BITTER PILL 17-
19 (1983). 
77. Besides cancer, DES is said to cause other serious medical problems, including 
miscarriage, uterine deformities, ectopic pregnancy, and breast cancer. In re DES Cases, 
789 F. Supp. at 557. 
78. MEYERS, supra note 76, at 17-19. 
79. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 557. 
80. Id. In Payton v. Abbott Lab., 780 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1985), both Abbott Labora-
tories and Eli Lilly were accused of violating FDA regulations. Payton, 780 F.2d at 149. 
81. See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 557. 
82. Bichler v. Eli Lilly, 55 N.Y.2d 571 (1982). 
83.Id. 
84. Id. at 578. The jury further found that the manufacturers failed to give adequate 
warnings of potential effects of DES on fetuses, which would have prevented numerous 
injuries. Id. at 571. 
85. Id. at 571. 
86. Manufacturers seeking approval to use DES to prevent miscarriages relied on 
studies compiled by four pharmaceutical companies, headed by Eli Lilly. Id. at 576. 
87. Payton v. Abbott Lab., 780 F.2d 147, 149 (1st Cir. 1985). 
88.Id. 
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authorization.89 
Like breast implant manufacturers, those manufacturing 
DES failed to adequately warn of the drug's potential dangers, 
failed to prove the drug's safety and effectiveness prior to its 
use, and continued to distribute the drug after they knew or 
should have known of the dangers.9o Instead of taking a prevent-
ative route, the FDA reversed its approval in 1971,91 only after 
mounting evidence that DES was ineffective for its intended use 
and dangerous to the fetus. 92 Had the FDA exercised its author-
ity at an earlier date, it could have insisted on proof of safety.93 
Now, overwhelming evidence exists linking DES to clear-cell 
vaginal cancer in daughters of women who ingested it while 
pregnant.94 Millions of women ingested DES and thousands of 
DES cases have clogged the courts for over a decade.911 
2. Dalhon Shield 
The A.H. Robins Company, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, 
distributed more than 4.5 million Dalkon Shields, an intrauter-
ine device used for birth control, in eighty countries between 
1971 and 1975.96 A.H. Robins failed to adequately test the 
Dalkon Shield97 and conducted no long-term studies on either 
the device's effectiveness or safety.98 As a result of using the 
89. Besides marketing and distributing DES to pregnant women on an unlimited 
basis, manufacturers continued to do so after the FDA pulled DES off the market for 
such use. Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 576. 
90. [d. at 578; see also Payton, 780 F.2d at 153. 
91. Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 577. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. at 571. Similarly, Judge Stanley Sporkin criticized the FDA for not exercis-
ing appropriate authority in accessing and compelling production of safety data regard-
ing silicone gel breast implants. Teich v. FDA, 732 F. Supp. 17, 20 (D.D.C. 1990). 
94. Shields v. Eli Lilly & Co., 895 F.2d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
95. See Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 577. 
96. MORTON MINTZ, Foreword to AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED. WOMEN AND THE 
DALKON SHIELD (1985). Dalkon Shiel"s were implanted in over two million women in the 
United States alone. [d. at 4. 
97. [d. at 4. 
98. [d. at 3. Approximately 110,000, or 5 percent of all users, became pregnant while 
wearing a Dalkon Shield, despite that A.H. Robins claimed a 1.1 percent pregnancy rate. 
While some physicians experienced pregnancy rates of less than 5 percent, many others 
experienced pregnancy rates in multiples of 5 percent. Bradley Post, an attorney who 
spent almost a decade analyzing Dalkon Shield statistics, believes that a 5 percent preg-
nancy rate is a reasonable estimate. Some of the most severe health consequences oc-
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Dalkon Shield, tens of thousands of women suffered serious inju-
ries, including pelvic infection, sterility, miscarriage, and 
death.99 As of 1985, Dalkon Shield wearers have filed approxi-
mately 20,000 claims against A.H. Robbins,loo forcing the manu-
facturer to pay $314.6 million in damages. lol 
In February 1977, a plaintiffs' lawyer realized the dangers of 
the Dalkon Shield and wrote a letter to A.H. Robins requesting 
"immediate removal of devices in use."102 A.H. Robins did not 
respond. l03 Four years later, a sequence of deaths due to the 
Dalkon Shield were reported. l04 On February 29, 1984, Judge 
Lordl05 pleaded for the company to recall the Dalkon Shield and 
to "give consideration to tracing down the victims and sparing 
them the agony that will surely be theirs."106 A.H. Robins re-
sponded by filing disciplinary proceedings against Judge Lord 
under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.107 
On August 22, 1972, the first Dalkon Shield related fatal 
curred when Dalkon Shield wearers became pregnant. Id. 
99. Id. at 6. 
100. Id. at 242. 
101. Id. In April 1985, G.E.R. Stiles, then senior vice-president and financial officer 
of A.H. Robins, revealed that an outside consultant indicated that the Dalkon Shield had 
injured approximately 88,000 women, of which approximately 20,000 would file claims. 
This estimate was done to assess the company's damages. Id. The company continued to 
market the Dalkon Shield abroad after it halted sales in· the United States in 1974. Be-
cause many countries that have used the Shield have poor medical conditions, injury and 
death rates were probably much higher than in the United States. Dr. Richard P. 
Dickey, a former member of the FDA's obstetrical and gynecological devices advisory 
panel, said that a woman who has developed an infection due to the Dalkon Shield, 
"where there are no doctors, no antibiotics, she's going to die." Id. at 5. 
102. Id. at 19. Bradley Post's letter to A.H. Robins urged the company to warn 
wearers to remove the Dalkon Shield. In a subsequent letter, Post repeated his plea, 
informing the company that the deaths of two young women were undoubtedly related to 
their use of Dalkon Shields and expressing his concerns for future fatalities. Again, A.H. 
Robins gave no response. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. In a prepared courtroom statement, Miles W. Lord, Chief U.S. District Judge 
for Minnesota, reprimanded three A.H. Robins' top officers for actions relating to sales 
of Dalkon Shields. Id. at 264-69. 
106. Id. at 269; see generally Carol T. Rieger, The Judicial Councils Reform and 
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act: Will Judges Judge Judges?, 37 EMORY L.J. 45, 67 
(1988). 
107. 28 U.S.C § 372 (1982); see Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1186-90 
(8th Cir. 1984). 
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spontaneous septic abortion occurred. lo8 Dr. C. Donald Chris-
tian, the doctor in this case and head of OB-GYN at the Univer-
sity of Arizona Medical Center in Tucson, mentioned the inci-
dent to another physician, who had seen an almost identical 
death with another Dalkon Shield wearer.109 Struck by the simi-
larities of the two deaths, Dr. Christian inquired among his col-
leagues and discovered that many other physicians' patients 
were having similar problems with IUD's, especially with the 
Dalkon Shield.llo Although Dr. Christian reported his adverse 
findings to the FDA, he claimed that the agency "kept telling 
[him] to go away."lll 
Under mounting pressure from adverse reports and a threat 
by Dr. Christian to publish an incriminating article in a medical 
journal,112 A.H. Robins submitted some limited safety informa-
tion to the FDA's Bureau of Medical Devices and Diagnostic 
Products (BMDDP).ll3 Subsequently, A.H. Robins sought FDA 
approval for a warning letter that would go to physicians who 
distribute the Dalkon Shield.114 The FDA device unit officials 
refused to approve the letter, calling it an inadequate method of 
informing physicians about the potential health risks. Uti Ten 
days later, the head of the device unit urged the FDA to seek a 
court order to enjoin A.H. Robins from distributing more 
Dalkon Shields and to recall the devices that were on the mar-
ket. lls The FDA declined to do SO.117 
In 1974, the FDA became concerned with reports that the 
Dalkon Shield caused spontaneous septic abortions and re-
quested A.H. Robins to suspend sales.ll8 The company 
complied. u9 
lOS. MINTZ, supra note 96, at 157. 
109. [d. 
1l0. [d. 
111. [d. 
112. [d. at 160. 
113. [d. 
114. [d. at 163. A.H. Robins also felt that the letter would help with defense against 
lawsuits as it could argue that the company had genuine concerns with women's health. 
[d. 
115. [d. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. 
I1S. [d. at 151. 
119. [d. 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss3/8
1993] FDA REGULATION & REFORM 987 
Litigation disclosed that A.H. Robbins suppressed vital in-
formation and adverse reports from various physicians and the 
medical community at large.12o Had there been a medical device 
law when the Dalkon Shield was introduced into the market, 
A.H. Robbins would have been required to prove its safety and 
effectiveness before entrance into the marketplace. Although the 
FDA had authority to request safety data,121 the agency did not 
do so in a timely manner. Similarly, the FDA's delayed response 
with regard to silicone gel· breast implants has caused more 
health problems and fear of development of future health 
problems for women. 
III. WHY HAS THE FDA BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN EF-
FECTIVEL Y PROTECTING WOMEN'S HEALTH? 
Although there has been relatively lax regulation of 
women's medical devices in the past decade, especially with 
medical devices which were on the market prior to the Medical 
Device Amendments, this author maintains that overwhelming 
social forces exist which exacerbate the need for stricter regula-
tion. This author contends that because of these forces, the need 
for consistently enforced regulation, especially regarding disclos-
ure requirements, is mandated. Many women who choose to 
have breast implants are not capable of making an informed de-
cision simply because accurate information is unavailable to 
them. Informed decisions are made difficult by corporations who 
put financial gain before long-term health, physicians who instill 
a false sense of security, and media images which falsely reflect 
the demographic composition of female body shapes and sizes. 
A. THE CORPORATE DILEMMA: PROFITS V. CONSUMER SAFETY 
The Dow Corning Corporation, one of the leading implant 
manufacturers, has put profit before women's health. For de-
cades, Dow Corning put silicone gel breast implants on the mar-
ket without conducting long-term safety studies.122 Dow Corning 
120. Id. at 152. 
121. 21 U.S.C. § 360 (1992). 
122. A Dow Corning internal document reveals a dog study, which consisted of a six 
month study for short-term effects and a two year study for "long· term" effects. Dow 
Corning, however, published the six month study as a long term study. In the six-month 
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suppressed scientific studies, concealed hazards to consumers,123 
and gave a false sense of security to the medical community and 
the FDA.124 Because of this false sense of security, the common 
belief was that breast implant surgery was a low-risk 
procedure.121i 
Dow Corning does not stand alone in appearing to have put 
its financial well-being ahead of the physical well-being of con-
sumers.126 Consider the following conduct of corporations in 
their quest for profits. Automobile manufacturers have know-
ingly marketed cars which explode in rear-end collisions;127 
chemical companies have sold pesticides abroad that have been 
prohibited in the United States;128 coal companies have falsified 
information about the cause of Black Lung disease;129 and tam-
pon manufacturers have put tampons on the market with prior 
knowledge as to the dangers of toxic shock syndrome.13o From 
these illustrations, one can conclude that left on their own, ab-
dog studies, there was very little change in the dogs. After two years, however, the tissue 
surrounding the implant showed inflammatory reactions and some dogs died. Dow Corn-
ing Corp., Summary of Scientific Studies (released to the public Feb. 10, 1992) (discovery 
documents on file with Golden Gate University Law Review). 
123. Boyce Rensberger, Reaction to Silicones was Denied; Despite 1974 Study, Dow 
Scientist Told FDA No Risk Seen, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1992, at AI. In 1974, a Dow 
Corning scientist found that silicone can trigger strong reaction of the immune system. 
Despite this, at an FDA hearing in November 1991, the company denied that silicone 
could cause any such reaction. Id. In 1987, Dow Corning was aware that its employees 
falsified documents concerning silicone gel breast implants. The company did not alert 
the FDA until October 1992. Thus, the FDA, during its hearings on silicone gel breast 
implants, had incomplete and inaccurate information because of the falsified records. 
Thomas M. Burton, Dow Corning Employees Falsified Data on Breast Implants, Coun-
sel Concludes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1992, at A3. 
124. Edward Terino, M.D., Address at the California Society of Plastic Surgeons, 
26th Annual Meeting (Mar. 3-7, 1976). 
125. Judy Mann, Implanting Corporate Responsibility, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1992, 
at E3. 
126. FDA's Reality Check, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1992, at A24. A.H. Robins, with its 
Dalkon shield, also gave a false sense of security to the medical profession. A.H. Robins 
suppressed information, insisted its product was safe, knowing of its inherent deadly 
risks, and continued to market the product abroad for eight months after taking it off 
the market in the United States. MINTZ, supra note 96, Foreword. 
127. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358-60 (Ct. App. 1981). 
128. MINTZ, supra note 96, at 247. 
129. Id. at 248. 
130. O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 817 (D. Kan. 1987) (jury 
awarded $11 million in damages to the family of a deceased victim of toxic shock syn-
drome, $10 million in punitive damages after deciding that Playtex, the manufacturer, 
had prior knowledge of the risks of its super-absorbent tampons and failed to warn 
consumers). 
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sent regulation, the private market may impose unreasonable 
and unnecessary risks on the public.131 
Corporate executives certainly do not intend harm and their 
actions and decisions are simply a natural ramification of capi- . 
talism. This author does not propose to discuss the merits of 
capitalism, but simply to say, where the bottom line is profits 
and the market is left unregulated, consumers will not be ade-
quately protected. Lax enforcement of regulatory lawsl32 com-
bined with the anti-regulation sentiments of the now disbanded 
White House Council for Competitivenessl33 and recently pro-
posed tort reform legislationl34 may operate to diminish the ef-
fectiveness of consumer protection legislation. 
B. COSMETIC SURGEONS AND THEIR VESTED INTERESTS 
Encouragement from cosmetic surgeons further reinforces 
the need for stricter regulation where women's health is con-
cerned, especially in the area of informed consent. While cos-
metic surgeons provide a service that some women desire, those 
131. See ASCH, supra note 10. 
132. During the Reagan and Bush administrations, FDA enforcement of regulation 
was lax as the agency was underfunded and operating under a deregulation philosophy. 
Malcolm Gladwell, Silicone Breast Implants; After a Decade o(Controversy, Key Ques-
tions are Unanswered and the Future of the Device is Unresolved, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 
1992, at Z1O. 
133. The White House's Council for Competitiveness was established in 1989 to per-
mit businesses more flexibility in order to compete more effectively. When faced with 
undesirable federal regulation, corporations could turn to the Competitiveness Council 
for relief. Daniel Isaac, They Can't Compete, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 7, 1992, at 1. On Janu-
ary 22, 1993, President Clinton abolished the Council, criticizing it as a way for powerful 
corporations to circumvent federal regulation. Clinton Scuttles Abortion Rights Limits, 
Puts Raft of Regulations Up for Review, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1993, at AI, A4. 
134. S. 3190, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 640 (1991). Senator John D. Rockefeller (D-VA) 
initially introduced the bill, known as the Product Liability Fairness Act on March 13, 
1991. It would limit damages manufacturers could be forced to pay for defective prod-
ucts and would make it more difficult for plaintiffs to sue in state courts. Senator Rocke-
feller is confident that the tort reform legislation will pass in the 103rd Congress. Sup-
porters of the bill believe that it is good for business and the economy. Critics claim that 
the law will encourage dangerous products and marketplace fraud and that victims of 
defective products will not be compensated. Product Liability, Product Liability Bill 
Dies in Senate Afte'r Supporters Fail to End Filibuster, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES: 
REGULATION, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, Sept. 11, 1992, at 177. The National Association 
of Manufacturers (NAM), a powerful pro-business lobby, has been trying to get such a 
bill passed for almost a decade. Gary Lee, Lobbyists Rush to Make Year Count; Recess, 
Hill Turnover Push Interest Groups Into High Gear, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1992, at A19. 
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who perform breast implants for cosmetic purposes may act out 
of self-serving interests, placing a higher priority on short-term 
profit than on long-term health consequences. This may ulti-
mately have an impact on women's health and safety. 
During the February 18-20, 1992,1311 FDA hearings concern-
ing the safety of silicone gel breast implants, the FDA heard 
from every conceivable witness, including cosmetic surgeons.136 
Generally, cosmetic surgeons have represented to women their 
belief that the implants are safe.137 
In 1983, the American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive 
Surgeons (ASPRS)138 initiated a $4 million public relations cam-
paign139 in defense of breast implants,t4o issuing press releases, 
before and after photos, and education brochures.141 Not only 
did the ASPRS represent that cosmetic surgery was safe, effec-
tive, and affordable, but also that it was essential to women's 
mental health142 and that flat-chestedness caused a "total lack of 
well being. "143 ASPRS issued a statement that there is medical 
evidence that "these deformities (small breasts) are really a 
135. Gladwell, supra note 132, at Z10. 
136. Id. 
137. Boodman, supra note 67, at Z10. 
138. The ASPRS has 4,000 members and represents over 90 percent of the country's 
plastic surgeons. Breast enlargement for cosmetic purposes accounts for approximately 
one-half of the practices of many members, according to Norman M. Cole, the president 
of the organization. Sandy Rovner, Implant Safety: Who's Right?, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 
1991, at Z12. 
139. In April 1992, ASPRS established a hot line to inform women seeking implants 
which plastic surgeons could counsel them. While this may appear altruistic, establishing 
the hotline was in response to FDA hearings where women testified that they were hav-
ing a hard time finding physicians who would remove the implants. Boodman, supra 
note 67, at Z10. 
140. SUSAN FALUDI. BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN, 
217 (1985). ASPRS has assessed a mandatory $350 fee from its members each year to 
help support the campaign. In 1991, the organization brought 400 women with breast 
implants to Washington to lobby, paying for the women's air fare and lodging. Rovner, 
supra note 138, at Z12. . 
141. Rovner, supra note 138, at Z12. 
142. Id. At an FDA advisory panel meeting held in November 1991, speakers as-
serted that breast implants "are vitally important to women who feel their bust is too 
small for a society that worships ... 'high, firm, large breasts.' " Physicians groups have 
claimed that silicone gel breast implants serve a medical need in the psychological reha-
bilitation of women with low self esteem. Malcolm Gladwell, Breast Implant Maker Of-
fers to Monitor Safety, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1992, at AI. 
143. FALUDl, supra note 140, at 217. 
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disease. "144 
While there are many ethical and devoted plastic surgeons 
with admirable ideals and principles who sincerely desire to help 
and heal people, reality suggests that it is unlikely that the AS-
PRS will stop encouraging women to undergo unnecessary surgi-
cal procedures. Women's health will be adequately protected 
only by strengthening regulation. Access to accurate and reliable 
information, promulgated through government regulation, would 
help ensure that women considering breast implant surgery are 
able to make informed and intelligent decisions. Only with accu-
rate information can women adequately evaluate the risks 
against the benefits of the desired surgery. 
C. CREATING THE MARKET 
The third and perhaps 'most pervasive social force illustrat-
ing the need for tighter regulation and the availability of accu-
rate information is media images. Advertisers, media,1411 cosmetic 
surgeons, and manufacturers have created a market which en-
forces the need for women to have "perfect" bodies.146 Faced 
with pressure to look "beautiful" along with assurances that this 
surgical procedure is safe, it is understandable why over two mil-
lion women have gone under the knife in an attempt to conform 
to the "ideal." That is their choice. Women should not be chas-
tised as being vain in a world that repeatedly assures them that 
they can safely become the "ideal" beauty.147 Absent accurate 
and reliable information, it is impossible to make a knowing, in-
telligent decision. 
144. Id. Some cosmetic surgeons refer to small breasts as a disease, micromastia, 
requiring treatment. FDA's Reality Check, supra note 126, at A24. 
145. See generally MARTIN A. LEE & NORMAN SOLOMON, UNRELIABLE SOURCES; A 
GUIDE TO DETECTING BIAS IN NEWS MEDIA (1990) (for a general discussion on media bi-
ases and influences). 
146. A model for a mannequin maker comments that getting breast implants is the 
only way to get a job because "big breasts are all the [modeling) agencies are hiring 
now." The new mannequin will have measurements of 34-23-36. Real women are sup-
posed to follow. FALUDI, supra note 140, at 200. Manufacturers who make products for 
women insist that magazines promote a certain kind of beauty, mainly the one that the 
manufacturers themselves have created. MARILYN FRENCH, THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN, 
171 (1992). 
147. See generally NAOMI WOLFE, THE BEAUTY MYTH; How IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE 
USED AGAINST WOMEN. (1992). 
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Manufacturer's failure to warn of known risks coupled with 
the media's bombardment of information, influences, and images 
reinforces the need for strict federal regulation. Lax regulation 
has resulted in many women making potentially life threatening 
decisions without informed consent.H8 Rarely and inconsistently 
enforced laws send a message to manufacturers that not all laws 
need to be complied with, while giving consumers a false sense 
of security. Consistent enforcement of health and safety regula-
tions will help protect consumers from potential misinformation 
and manufacturers from potential liability. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the FDA owes the public a duty to protect it to the 
best of its ability, a balance must be struck between the public's 
interest in its health and safety and the burden placed on manu-
facturers as a result of too much regulation. The public has a 
legitimate interest in the safety of medical products so that it 
will not have to face medical decisions with misinformation and 
fear of misrepresentation. Contrarily, too much regulation is not 
desirable because the manufacturing of life enhancing and life 
savmg new drugs and medical devices would come to a 
standstill. 
Based on the past experiences of women with regard to un-
safe medical devices which have been sold for years absent a 
demonstration of safety and effectiveness, this author recom-
mends that the FDA, Congress, and states take the following ac-
tions to alleviate the current silicone gel breast implant debacle 
and to prevent other such disasters from occurring. 
148. Sybil Goldrich, a breast cancer survivor who had both breasts amputated in 
1983 as a result of cancer, sought reconstruction following her surgery. Goldrich inter-
viewed four plastic surgeons, whose consensus was that implants would be the simplest 
and least traumatic solution. No surgeon told Goldrich that this simple operation would 
turn into five operations, take ten months, require more than fifteen hours of anesthesia, 
and cause countless days of pain and worry. Goldrich's implants hardened, migrated, and 
generated one infection after the other. In the end, Goldrich was no closer to restoration 
than when she began; she simply had more scars. Had she known of the risks, she would 
have given her decision a lot more thought. Goldrich, supra note 44. 
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A. MANUFACTURERS SHOULD BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROOF FOR 
DEMONSTRATING A PRODUCT'S SAFETY 
According to current law, manufacturers are required to 
demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of new medical devices 
before entrance into the stream of commerce.149 Despite discus-
sion that the burden should be on the FDA to prove a device is 
unsafe/ 50 the burden of demonstrating the safety and effective-
ness of medical devices should remain with manufacturers as it 
would be much too large a burden for a federal agency to be 
solely responsible for ensuring the safety of foods, drugs and 
medical devices. The FDA's responsibility is to ensure that man-
ufacturers comply with the law by conducting appropriate safety 
and effectiveness studies, promptly submitting FDA requested 
information, and disclosing serious complaints. 1111 
The FDA should require manufacturers to strictly follow 
appropriate guidelines when conducting safety tests on products 
so that the FDA can efficiently assess the accuracy and reliabil-
ity of the studies.152 The FDA can most efficiently ensure that 
products are safe for the public when manufacturers comply in 
good faith, using appropriate guidelines to shoulder their burden 
of demonstrating safety and effectiveness. 
This author argues that for medical devices which are not 
medically necessary, the FDA should place a higher burden of 
proof on the manufacturers, one proportionate to the public 
health need of the product. Arguably, silicone gel breast im-
plants used exclusively for cosmetic reasons fall into this cate-
gory. Contrast this with orphan drugs153 or experimental drugs1ll4 
149. 21 u.s.c. § 334(b)(I)(A) (1992). 
150. Sample letters sent to members of Congress and the news media which ASPRS 
helped mobilize in response to a CBS broadcast by Connie Chung about silicone gel 
breast implants suggested that the FDA, rather than the manufacturer, should have the 
burden of proving that a device is not safe and effective for its intended purpose. 
Rovner, supra note 138, at Z12. 
151. 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1992). 
152. The FDA regards itself as "the world's leading institution for scientific con-
sumer protection." All FDA actions are to be based on scientific facts. The FDA relies on 
the Official Methods of Analysis of the Association of Official Analytical Chemists, a 
book of test methods which has been published since 1895 and is an internationally rec-
ognized authority for appropriate laboratory methods. Janssen, supra note 10, at 7. 
153. Orphan drugs are drugs for very rare, serious diseases that manufacturers are 
permitted to market absent FDA approval because of the grave social need. Because the 
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for severely ill persons which are sometimes permitted into the 
stream of commerce despite adverse side effects. In such cases, 
the burden of proof on the manufacturer is understandably 
lower, as the side effects are insignificant compared to the life-
prolonging therapeutic value. 
In addition, the FDA should allot manufacturers a limited 
time period to demonstrate the safety of a product after legisla-
tion is passed which would have required the manufacturer to 
demonstrate a product's safety and effectiveness prior to its en-
trance onto the market. Liberal grandfathering policiesI55 may 
defeat the purpose of the law, which is to prevent harm.15S Both 
the Dalkon Shield and silicone gel breast implants were 
grandfathered in. The tragedies which followed may have been 
diverted or reduced had there not been such liberal grandfather-
ing policies. Thus, stricter grandfathering policies should be de-
veloped whenever new safety legislation is implemented. 
B. THE FDA SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERY POWERS SIMILAR TO 
LITIGATORS 
The FDA should have the authority to subpoena docu-
ments, researchers,157 and executive decisionmakers. If the goal 
is to prevent harm rather than compensate those injured, discov-
ery through litigation comes too late. IlI8 In the case of silicone' gel 
diseases are so rare, it is not commercially feasible for manufacturers to invest time, 
money, and resources into development. 21 U.S.C.S. § 360(a)(a) (1992). 
154. Because of the overriding social need for the severely ill to obtain potentially 
life·saving drugs, the FDA and various states have implemented procedures whereby the 
time·consuming process usually required for approval may be circumvented in cases of 
life· threatening diseases, such as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Robert 
C. Waters, Obtaining Experimental Drugs for Severely III Clients; The Dilemma 
Caused by AIDS, FLA. BAR J., May 1989, at 7-9. 
155. Preamendment devices were grandfathered in. "Grand fathered in" refers to the 
fact that a new law does not apply retroactively. Thus, since breast implants were on the 
market prior to the 1976 Medical Device Amendment, implant manufacturers did not 
have to prove the implant's safety and effectiveness as would be required of a product 
that was not on the market when the new law was enacted. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON 
THE POSSIBLE HEALTH RISKS OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS, 1 (1991). 
156. 21 U.S.C. § 334(b)(I)(A) (1992). 
157. Many researchers and experts who have testified in breast implant litigation 
are, under court order, prohibited from disclosing valuable public information. Wise, 
supra note 35, at 1-2. 
158. See also Koch, Discovery in Rulemaking. 1977 DUKE L.J. 295, 345 (suggesting 
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breast implants, the most valuable and accurate information was 
disclosed during pre-trial discovery159 and through consumer ad-
vocate groups seeking to accurately inform the public.160 
Protective orders should not apply to the FDA when the 
agency requests documents solely to assess a product's safety. 
The compelling government interest of protecting the public 
from significant danger outweighs the harm of disclosure to the 
manufacturer. Evidence from breast implant litigation was 
under court seal throughout the 1980'S/61 unavailable to the 
public, to lawyers with potential clients, and, most significantly, 
to the FDA.162 While data which constitutes confidential com-
mercial information is immune from disclosure when it would 
cause "substantial harm to [Dow's] competitive position,"163 an 
issue so directly affecting women's health should not be sup- . 
pressed from the federal agency authorized to oversee the pub-
lic's health and safety.164 The FDA should have access to this 
information so that it can assess the importance of it and warn 
the public if necessary. 
C. THE FDA SHOULD USE EXTREME SANCTIONS FOR REFUSAL TO 
COOPERATE WHEN IT HAS REQUESTED INFORMATION 
Under the statutory guidelines for FDA rulemaking,165 par-
ties are required to use "good faith" and diligence in supplying 
the FDA with unfavorable as well as favorable information. Al-
though good faith has various meanings to different parties and 
is difficult to prove, the FDA has had sufficient experience to 
that "any improvement in the information gathering process will enhance the policy de-
cision expre&sed in the rule"); cf. Todd R. Smyth, Note, The FDA's Public Board of 
Inquiry and the Aspartame Decision, 58 IND. L.J. 627, 642 (1983) (suggesting that the 
FDA should have more liberal discovery policies with regard to its rulemaking 
functions). 
159. DeBenedictis, supra note 52, at 20; see Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., No. C-
91-2132, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 8580 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 1992). 
160. Wise, supra note 35, at 1-2. 
161. Id. at 1. 
162. Id. 
163. Teich v. FDA, 732 F. Supp. 17, 17 (D.D.C. 1990). 
164. Teich v. FDA, 751 F. Supp. 243 (D. D.C. 1990) (consumer group Public Citizen 
sues FDA for release of documents in order to disseminate safety information to the 
public). The court found Dow Corning's claim that disclosure of the protected docu-
ments would cause the company competitive injury unpersuasive. Id. at 249. 
165. 21 C.F.R. § 13.25 (1981). 
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make these factual determinations and to set policy regarding 
what is and is not good faith. Upon discovery that any party did 
not use "good faith" and diligence in turning over unfavorable 
data or upon discovery that any party misrepresented or falsi-
fied information in a,ny way, the FDA should implement eco-
nomic sanctions against that party in proportion to its assets. 
In addition, the FDA should require manufacturers to dis-
close any adverse reports from either physicians or patients re-
garding their product. Refraining from fully cooperating with 
such a rule would· constitute grounds for sanctions on the 
manufacturer. 
D. CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD ELIM-
INATE OR REDUCE PRESSURE WHICH CORPORATIONS AND Gov-
ERNMENT CAN PUT ON THE FDA 
Congress should implement new legislation for campaign fi-
nancing so that money cannot buy beneficial laws. Currently, 
corporations can put pressure on the FDA to take certain ac-
tions166 through lobbying members of Congress and giving mem-
bers large campaign donations. 167 In the past, members of Con-
gress have pressured the FDA to take certain actions,168 acting 
on behalf of powerful Political Action Committees (PACS),t69 
corporations, or industry representatives.17o These actions may 
not always be to the public's benefit. A powerful corporation can 
166. After a board decided against aspartame approval, "Searle stepped up pressure 
on the FDA ... by threatening to press a lawsuit filed earlier in an attempt to force a 
final decision." Cf. Smyth, supra note 158, at 635. 
167. After receiving a $117,593 contribution from A.H. Robins, Senator Paul S. 
Trible, Jr. introduced a bill which would cap damages and allow a manufacturer to pay 
punitive damages only once. Under pressure from women's groups, trial lawyers, and 
consumer groups, Senator Trible dropped the bill and it did not come up before the 
Senate. MINTZ, supra note 96, at 238-240. 
168. For example, the White House's Competitive Council "wooed the biotechnology 
industry by pushing the FDA to rule that genetically engineered foods are not inherently 
dangerous." No Dummies, These Biotechies, 24 NAT'L J. at 1711 (1992). 
169. ASPRS has formed its own political action committee, PlastyPAC. Rovner, 
supra note 138, at Z12. 
170. FDA Commissioner David Kessler endured intense lobbying by both plastic 
surgeons and manufacturers of silicone gel breast implants when the FDA sharply re-
stricted the use of the silicone gel breast implants. Julie Kosterlitz, High Wire Act, 24 
NAT'L J. 1289, 1289 (1992). Consumer groups believe that political pressure from indus-
try and the White House will cause FDA Commissioner Kessler to postpone the deadline 
for industry compliance with recently promulgated food-labeling regulations. [d. 
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have a great deal of influence on legislative decisions. Campaign 
finance reforml71 could help curb the ext~aordinary influence 
that large corporations presently have over legislative decisions. 
E. ADVISORY COMMITTEES SHOULD BE COMPRISED OF INDEPEN-
DENT SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS 
Advisory committees are comprised of experts from both 
the public and private sector who provide valuable expertise to 
federal agencies on various problems, from personnel decisions 
to complex technical difficulties.172 The Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Actl73 (FACA) requires that advisory committees be com-
posed of members who are "balanced in terms of the points of 
view represented and cannot be inappropriately influenced . 
by any special interest."174 
Avoiding conflicts of interest, however, can be extremely 
difficult. 175 Consider silicone gel breast implants. Arguably, those 
with the most expertise are manufacturers and surgeons, pre-
cisely those who derive a pecuniary benefit from the availability 
of the devices. Clearly, a potential conflict of interest exists. If 
the committee is to be comprised of a balance of members repre-
senting various interests, then there must be experts on the ad-
visory committee who are advocates of regulation and who place 
a high value on health and safety. The difficulty with this is that 
members who speak out on behalf of the public are not always 
experts. Where unavoidable conflicts of interest exist, the FDA 
should factor into its decisions who was advising and to what 
degree an expert's conflict of interest may influence his or her 
judgment. 
The FDA should require committee members to submit fi-
nancial disclosures of potential conflicts of interest' and such 
171. Soon after his election victory, President Clinton imposed a five-year ban on 
certain lobbying for major executive branch appointees and a lifetime curb on represent-
ing foreign governments. If similar ethical reforms applied to Congress' campaign financ-
ing, institutional congressional bribery could be greatly curtailed. C{. Rob Quartel, Re-
, form Congress Too, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1992, at A23. 
172. Michael H. Cardozo, The Federal Advisory Committee Act in Operation, 33 
ADMIN. L. REV. I, 1-2 (1981) .. 
173. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988 & Supp. I 1989). 
174. Nuszkiewicz, supra note 49, at 959. 
175. ld, at 975. 
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conflicts should be disclosed to the public. Additionally, if other 
conflicts of interest exist, they should be published in the Fed-
eral Register so that the public has knowledge of such conflicts. 
Not only may knowledge of publication deter serious conflicts of 
interest from arising, but it can foster respect for the FDA's 
credibility concerning important and controversial decisions. 
F. SCIENTIFIC DECISIONMAKING BODIES SUCH AS THE BOARD OR 
ADVISORY PANEL SHOULD DEFINE AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF 
UNCERTAINTY OF KNOWLEDGE ON A PARTICULAR QUESTION 
Many decisions, especially those involving technical difficul-
ties, are based on conflicting views or on evidence which has not 
been conclusively proven. In such cases, FDA advisors· should 
factor into their rule making decisions the level of uncertainty of 
knowledge on a particular question. "The regulator can then ap-
ply that definition as a factor in making the final decision of a 
regulatory matter."176 This would enable the. agency more flexi-
bility in its determinations and, because the decision would be 
based on inconclusive evidence, would constitute constructive 
notice to the public in the event that the agency gathers more 
information and changes its policies accordingly. 
G. STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT THEIR OWN SAFETY REGULATIONS 
TO SUPPLEMENT THOSE PROMULGATED BY CONGRESS AND THE 
FDA 
Although medical devices are federally regulated, states may 
impose safety regulations on them, provided that such state law 
requirements are not "in addition to or different from those 
mandated by the FDA."177 Thus, if the FDA has not yet im-
posed restrictions on particular medical devices, such as 
preamendment devices,178 a state may establish statutes, regula-
176. Smyth, supra note 158, at 640. 
177. King v. Collagen Corp., No. 92-1278, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 432 (lst Cir. Jan. 
15, 1993) (holding that regulatory approval of medical devices largely shields manufac-
turers from liability for injuries to users); see also Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712 
F. Supp. 13, 14 (D. Conn. 1989) (holding that agency regulations will preempt state or 
local legislation only if such legislation is in conflict with the federal law or frustrates its 
purpose). 
178. See supra note 21. 
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tions, or ordinances to regulate them.179 If, however, the FDA 
has imposed federal requirements relating to a medical device, 
the law provides that states may petition the FDA to permit ad-
ditional state requirements.18o 
Because federal regulation, by itself, may provide insuffi-
cient protection, states should be encouraged to enact legislation 
to more effectively protect their citizens. Prior to the FDA's de-
cision to require silicone gel breast implant patients to read and 
sign a detailed informed, consent form,181 Marylandl82 and Ne-
vadal83 had laws requiring such disclosure. California recently 
adopted a similar law, requiring surgeons and physicians to in-
form patients of possible risks which may be linked to silicone 
gel breast implants.184 
States might also consider legislation requiring corporations 
to disclose concealed dangers of products. California's new Cor-
porate Criminal Liability Actl81i requires that manufacturers no-
tify California state officials of serious concealed dangers in a 
product introduced in the state. Punishable by imprisonment 
and/or a fine, such laws may force corporate decisionmakers to 
evaluate the dilemma between safety and economic gain more 
carefully.186 Presently, the district attorney in Los Angeles is in-
vestigating whether Dow Corning violated this law by failing to 
notify California state officials about the dangers of the com-
pany's silicone gel breast implants.187 Such investigations should 
continue and prosecutions should proliferate. Policy changes at 
the state level will earn public approval, which in turn may gen-
erate positive reforms at the federal level. 
179. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a)(1)(2) (1992). 
180. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(b) (1992). 
181. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, u.s. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, BACKGROUND INFORMATION: USE OF SILICONE GEL-FILLED BREAST IMPLANTS 
UNDER STAGE 2 PROTOCOLS (1992). 
182. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-114 (1992). 
183. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.750 (1991). 
184, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2259 (Deering 1992). 
185. CAL. PENAL CODE § 387 (Deering 1992), 
186. Corporate officers may face up to three years in a state penitentiary and a 
$25,000 fine, [d. 
187. Mann, supra note 125, at E3. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Industry representatives and consumer advocacy groups 
have often disagreed over the degree of regulation that govern-
mental administrative bodies should employ. On the one hand, 
it is costly and inefficient to go through the maze of regulatory 
procedures which is presently required. On the other hand, con-
sumers should have some assurance that business cannot disre-
gard safety and manufacture products with total disregard for 
the ultimate consumer. A balance can and must be struck be-
tween the needs of industry and the desire for an acceptable de-
gree of safety. Achieving such a balance will require cooperation 
from Congress, the FDA, industry representatives, consumer ad-
vocacy groups, manufacturers, and the public at large. Positive 
steps have been made toward effectuating more responsible in-
dustry, government, and consumer representatives. President 
Clinton began speaking of government ethics reform and conflict 
of interest problems shortly after his election victory. ISS Addi-
tionally, a variety of consumer groups have emerged, with the 
goal of gathering and disseminating crucial information for 
women considering breast implant surgery.IS9 Fifty corporations 
have formed a trade association called Business for Social Re-
sponsibility to counter organizations such as the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce and the now disbanded White House Competitive-
ness Council. l90 More importantly, the FDA has made reforms 
toward tough regulatory enforcement in matters affecting public 
safety. The travesty of DES, the Dalkon Shield, and silicone gel 
breast implants must not be ignored or repeated. It is essential 
for federal regulation to compel manufacturers to comply with 
safety and disclosure requirements. The FDA should continue to 
work toward overcoming problems in the current regulatory 
scheme for all who rely on its expertise. 
188. Quartel, supra note 171, at A23. 
189. Such organizations include Command Trust Network, Inc., Public Citizen's 
Health Research Group, National Women's Health Network, American Silicone Implant 
Survivors, and the Breast Implant Information Foundation. Gladwell, supra note 132, at 
ZlO. 
190. CapitaLism with a Conscience, 24 NAT'L J. 1422, 1422 (1992). Businesses for 
Social Responsibility intends to work for stronger safety regulations and lobby for in-
creased investment in health, education and welfare. Members include Cedar Knolls, 
Body Shop USA, First Housing Co., Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream, Lotus Development Corp., 
and Reebok International, Ltd. Id. 
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